
Why People Trust: Evidence from Economic Games
Trust presents a paradox. It is an essential component to any lasting relationship, viable organization, or well-functioning economy - yet philosophers through the ages have counseled people against making themselves vulnerable by placing their trust in others. Neoclassical economic treatments of trust agree, concluding that one should not trust because others will surely exploit any vulnerability to maximize their own material self-interest. The departure point for the current research, done in collaboration with Detlef Fetchenhauer, is the observation that participants playing economic games in the laboratory commonly choose to trust complete strangers in ways that violate the neoclassical economic analysis. In this research, we work to find what psychological mechanisms prompt people to trust in these economic games, given that economic variables tend to play a rather minor role. Although our work is not yet complete, it appears that the decision to trust is very responsive to the mandates of being placed in a social relationship with another person - no matter how distant, anonymous, and fleeting that relationship is - and that the decision is more related to the emotion than to more "rational" considerations.