Matthew Lieberman
University of California, Los Angeles

 

 

 

Thursday, January 13, 2005
Lazenby Hall, Room 34, at 4 PM 

 

When symbolic processing of affect disrupts affective responses: A social-cognitive neuroscience approach

Spinoza once wrote that “Emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea, thereof.”  If putting feelings into words disrupts those very feelings, then this might provide one of the mechanisms by which talk therapies, journal writing, and social support all benefit mental and physical health.  In this talk, I will present a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that examine the neural bases of this disruption process in affect and stereotyping.  In particular, I will focus on the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and its role in both labeling affect and inhibiting affective processes in regions like the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex.  Critically, these studies suggest that this disruption process occurs in the absence of any intention to regulate one’s affect.  These processes suggest, paradoxically, that truly automatic processes can be disrupted by controlled processes and that our conception and definitions of automaticity and control may be in need of revision.  I will also discuss why this disruption process
may have evolved in humans.